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1. Introduction
A central concern is the extent to which competitive market systems are efficient and, in
the idealized model of Arrow-Debreu, efficiency follows under mild conditions, notably the
absence of externalities. But in recent years, economists have become interested in studying
less idealized market situations and in examining the pervasive inefficiencies that may exist.
This paper studies a market situation which arises through an explicit non-cooperative game,
played by buyers and sellers, where investments which determine the character of goods are
chosen before market interaction occurs. Two potential inefficiencies arise: these are often
referred to as the hold-up problem and as coordination failures. An important part of our
analysis will be to examine the connection between, as well as the extent of, the inefficiencies
induced by these two problems and whether market competition may solve them.
The hold-up problem applies when a group of agents, e.g. a buyer and a seller, share some
surplus from interaction and when an agent making an investment is unable to receive all the
benefits that accrue from that investment. The existence of the problem is generally traced
to incomplete contracts: with complete contracts, the inefficiency induced by the failure to
capture benefits will not persist (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Grout, 1984, Hart and Moore,
1988, Williamson, 1985). Coordination failures arise when a group of agents can realise a
mutual gain only by a change in behaviour of each member of the group. For instance, a
buyer may receive the marginal benefits from an investment when she is matched with a
particular seller, so there is no hold-up problem, but she may be inefficiently matched with a
seller; the incentive to change the match may not exist because gains may be realised only if
the buyer to be displaced is willing to alter her investment.
What happens if the interaction of agents is through the market place? In an Arrow-
Debreu competitive model, complete markets, with price taking in each market, are assumed;
if an agent chooses investment ex ante, every different level of investment may be thought of
as providing the agent with a different good to bring to the market (Makowski and Ostroy,
1995). If a buyer wishes to choose some investment level and the seller he trades with prefers
to trade with this buyer rather than with another buyer then total surplus to be divided
must be maximized: investment will be efficiently chosen and there is no hold-up problem.
The existence of complete markets implies that prices for all investment levels are known:
complete markets imply complete contracts. In addition, as long as there are no externalities,
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the return from any match is independent of the actions of agents not part of the match so
coordination failures do not arise. However, if the market place is such that there is pricing
only of trades which take place ex post, only a limited number of contracts are specified:
incomplete markets imply incomplete contracts.
There are a variety of applications where understanding the effect of competition on hold-
up and coordination failures is likely to be relevant. One example is a labour market where
employees and employers have to make specific human capital and technological investments
in advance of the matching process that leads to a successful employment relationship. An-
other example is the relationship between suppliers and manufacturers (see Calzolari et al.
(2015), for an analysis of this relationship in the German car manufacturing industry). If
the technology requires firm or model specific intermediate parts the absence of a long term
contract may lead to a hold-up problem with underinvestment on the part of the supplier,
but competition among a possibly small number of suppliers may reduce the inefficiencies
associated with such a hold-up problem at the cost of introducing inefficiencies that take the
form of coordination failures (inefficient selection of supplier).
This paper investigates the efficiency of investments when the trading pattern and terms
of trade are determined explicitly by a non-cooperative model of competition between buyers
and sellers. To ensure that there are no market power inefficiencies, a model of Bertrand
competition is analyzed where agents invest prior to trade. There are a finite number of
agents to ensure that patterns of trade can be changed by individual agents. By definition,
buyers bid to trade with sellers. Contracts are the result of competition and our interest is the
degree to which hold-up and coordination problems are mitigated by competitive contracts.
In this regard, it should be said that Bertrand competition in contingent contracts are ruled
out; in our analysis, contracts take the form of an agreement between a buyer and a seller
to trade at a particular price. We are thus investigating the efficiency of a simple trading
structure rather than attempting explicitly to devise contracts to address particular problems
(Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1994, Maskin and Tirole, 1999, Segal and Whinston, 1998).
We restrict attention to markets where the Bertrand competitive outcome is robust to the
way that markets are made to clear. To be specific, we assume that buyers and sellers can
be ordered by their ability to generate surplus with a complementarity between buyers and
sellers. Under a weak specification of the market clearing process, this gives rise to assortative
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matching in the quality of buyers and sellers where quality is in part determined by investment
choices. If investment levels are not subject to choice then the Bertrand equilibrium is always
efficient.
Consider first the sellers’ equilibrium investments. We show that these investments are
inefficient and a hold-up problem arises. In essence, sellers choose investments to maximize
the surplus that would be created if he were to be matched with the runner-up in the bidding
to be matched with him.
We then demonstrate that buyers’ investment levels are constrained efficient. For a given
equilibrium match, if a buyer bids just enough to win the right to trade with a seller then, as
a result of any extra investment, she would need to make only the same bid to win the right
to trade with the same seller - she would receive all the marginal benefits of investment. This
result is extended to show that buyers also receive the marginal value of their investments
even when this involves a change in match. A consequence of this is the existence of an
equilibrium outcome where all buyers make constrained efficient choices; the constraint that
qualifies this equilibrium is the set of other agents’ investment choices.
Compatible with constrained efficiency is an outcome where a buyer overinvests because
she is matched with a seller of too high a quality because another buyer has underinvested
because she, in turn, is matched with a seller of too low a quality, and vice versa. Thus,
coordination failures may arise with resulting inefficiency. However, we show that these
inefficiencies will not arise if the returns from investments differ sufficiently across buyers.
Under concavity restrictions on the match technology, the blunted incentive faced by
sellers is small and the total cost of the inefficiency is bounded by the inefficiency that could be
created by a single seller underinvesting with all others investing efficiently. However, if there
are more buyers than sellers, as we assume, the runner-up buyer to the lowest quality seller will
not be matched in equilibrium and will choose not to invest. With strong complementarities
between buyers and sellers, the lowest quality seller will not invest and this gives the incentive
to the buyer with whom he is matched, the potential runner-up in the bid for the second
lowest quality seller, not to invest. This gives the incentive not to invest to the second lowest
seller, and so on. Thus there will be a cascade of no investment which ensures an equilibrium
far from efficiency.
However, the hold-up misincentives just described also work to reduce coordination failure
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inefficiencies. Sellers who change their investments and their match partner do not necessarily
alter the runner-up in the bid to be matched with them. In particular, when market trading
is structured so that competition among buyers is at its most intense, the case on which we
principally focus, no coordination problems arise on the sellers’ side of the market. It is the
blunted incentives created by the hold-up problem that remove the inefficiencies that come
from coordination failures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After a discussion of related literature in the
next section, Section 3 lays down the basic model and the extensive form of the Bertrand
competition game between buyers and sellers. It is then shown in Section 4 that, with fixed
investments, the competition game gives rise to an efficient outcome — buyers and sellers
match efficiently. Section 5 characterizes the sellers’ optimal choice of ex-ante investments
for given buyers’ qualities. We show that, in equilibrium, sellers underinvest. We then
consider in Section 6 the optimal choice of the buyers’ ex-ante investments. Section 7 presents
the equilibrium characterization. There always exists an equilibrium with efficient matches.
However, depending on parameters, we show that equilibria with coordination failures may
arise that lead to inefficient matches. Section 8 provides concluding remarks. For ease of
exposition, all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
There is a considerable literature that analyzes ex ante investments in a matching environ-
ment. Some of the existing papers focus on general as opposed to match specific investments
and identify the structure of contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993) or the structure of
competition (Holmstro¨m, 1999) and market structure (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, Spulber,
2002) that may lead to inefficiency. Other papers (Acemoglu, 1997, Ramey and Watson,
2001) focus on the inefficiencies induced by the probability of match break-up.1 Kranton
and Minehart (2001) consider investments in the market structure itself; specifically markets
are limited by networks that agents create through investment. A recent paper by Mailath,
Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2011) looks at the structure of market clearing in a very different
market to ours; however, they highlight the possibility of inefficiencies due to coordination
1Notice that Ramey and Watson (2001) also consider how matching frictions can alleviate the inefficiencies
due to the hold-up problem in the presence of incomplete contracts and match specific investments in an
ongoing repeated relationship. See also Ramey and Watson (1997) for a related result.
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failures that can arise in their framework.
Burdett and Coles (2001), Peters and Siow (2002) and Peters (2007) focus on the efficiency
of investments in a model of non-transferable utility, in other words a marriage market. The
recent paper by Peters can be viewed as the non-transferable utility analogue of the present
paper. With non-transferable utility, the role of competition cannot be addressed.
The other two papers closest to our analysis are Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a)
and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b). They analyze a model where there are two sides
of the market and match specific investments are chosen ex ante. However, the matching
process is modelled as a cooperative assignment game. In Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001a), there are a finite number of different types of individual on each side of the market.
Efficiency can result when a condition termed double-overlapping, which requires the presence
of other agents with the same characteristics as any one agent, is satisfied. Their other paper,
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b), deals with a continuum of types; this makes it less
like the set-up of the present paper.
Finally, de Meza and Lockwood (2004) and Chatterjee and Chiu (2005) also analyze a
matching environment with transferable utility in which both sides of the market can under-
take match specific investments. They focus on a setup that delivers inefficient investments
and explore how asset ownership may enhance welfare (as in Grossman and Hart (1986)).
3. The Framework
We consider a simple matching model: S buyers match with T sellers, we assume that
the number of buyers is higher than the number of sellers S > T . Each seller is assumed
to match only with one buyer. Buyers and sellers are labelled, respectively, s = 1, . . . , S
and t = 1, . . . , T . Both buyers and sellers can make (heterogeneous) investments, denoted
respectively xs and yt, incurring costs C(xs) respectively C(yt).
2 The cost function C(·)
is twice differentiable, strictly convex and C(0) = 0. The surplus of each match is then a
function of the quality of the buyer σ and the seller τ involved in the match: v(σ, τ). Each
buyer’s quality is itself a function of the buyer’s innate ability, indexed by his identity s, and
the buyer’s specific investment xs: σ(s, xs). In the same way, each seller’s quality is a function
2For simplicity we take both cost functions to be identical, none of our results depending on this assump-
tion. If the cost functions were type specific we would require the marginal costs to increase with the identity
of the buyer or the seller.
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of the seller’s innate ability, indexed by her identity t, and the seller’s specific investment yt:
τ(t, yt).
3
We assume that quality is a desirable attribute and that there is complementarity between
the qualities of the buyer and the seller involved in a match. In other words, the higher is
the quality of the buyer and the seller the higher is the surplus generated by the match:4
v1(σ, τ) > 0, v2(σ, τ) > 0. Further, the marginal surplus generated by a higher quality of the
buyer or of the seller in the match increases with the quality of the partner: v12(σ, τ) > 0. We
also assume that the quality of the buyer depends negatively on the buyer’s innate ability s,
σ1(s, xs) < 0 (so that buyer s = 1 is the highest ability buyer) and positively on the buyer’s
specific investment xs: σ2(s, xs) > 0. Similarly, the quality of a seller depends negatively
on the seller’s innate ability t, τ1(t, yt) < 0, (seller t = 1 is the highest ability seller) and
positively on the seller’s investment yt: τ2(t, yt) > 0. Finally we assume that the quality of
both the buyers and the sellers satisfy a single crossing condition requiring that the marginal
productivity of both buyers and sellers investments decreases in their innate ability index:
σ12(s, xs) < 0 and τ12(t, yt) < 0.
The combination of the assumption of complementarity and the single crossing condition
gives a particular meaning to the term heterogeneous investments that we used for xs and yt.
Indeed, in our setting, the investments xs and yt have a use and value in matches other than
(s, t); however, these values change (decrease) with the identity of the partner implying that
at least one component of this value is “specific” to the match in question, since we consider
a discrete number of buyers and sellers.
We also assume that the surplus of each match is concave in the buyers and sellers quality
— v11(σ, τ) < 0, v11(σ, τ) < 0 — and that the quality of both sellers and buyers exhibit
decreasing marginal returns in their investments: σ11(σ, τ) < 0 and τ22(σ, τ) < 0.
5
We assume the following extensive forms of the Bertrand competition game in which
the T sellers and the S buyers engage. Buyers Bertrand compete for sellers. All buyers
3For convenience both σ(·, ·) and τ(·, ·) are assumed to be twice differentiable on [1, S]× R+.
4For convenience we denote with vl(·, ·) the partial derivative of the surplus function v(·, ·) with respect
to the l-th argument and with vlk(·, ·) the cross-partial derivative with respect to the l-th and k-th argument
or the second-partial derivatives if l = k. We use the same notation for the functions σ(·, ·) and τ(·, ·) defined
above.
5As established in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1994) and Edlin and Shannon
(1998) our results can be derived with much weaker assumptions on the smoothness and concavity of the
surplus function v(·, ·) and the two quality functions σ(·, ·) and τ(·, ·) in the two investments xs and yt.
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simultaneously and independently submit bids to the T sellers. Notice that we allow buyers
to submit bids to more than one, possibly all sellers. Each seller observes the bids she received
and decides which offer to accept. We assume that this decision is taken in the order of seller’s
identities (innate abilities) (1, . . . , T ). In other words, the seller labelled 1 decides first which
bid to accept. This commits the buyer selected to a match with seller 1 and automatically
withdraws all bids this buyer made to the other sellers. All other sellers and buyers observe
this decision and then seller 2 decides which bid to accept. This process is repeated until
seller T decides which bid to accept. Notice that, since S > T, even seller T , the last seller
to decide, can choose among multiple bids.6
We look for the set of cautious equilibria of our model so as to rule out equilibria in which
(unsuccessful) bids exceed buyers’ valuations. The basic idea behind this equilibrium concept
is that no buyer should be willing to make a bid that would leave the buyer worse off relative
to the equilibrium if accepted.7 A cautious equilibrium is equivalent to equilibrium in weakly
dominant strategies. In the construction of the cautious equilibrium we allow buyers, when
submitting a bid, to state that they are prepared to bid more if this becomes necessary. We
then restrict the strategy choice of each seller to be such that each seller selects bids starting
with a higher-order probability on the highest bids and allocates a lower-order probability of
being selected on a bid submitted by a buyer that did not specify such a proviso.8
The logic behind this additional restriction derives from the observation that in the ex-
tensive form of the Bertrand game there exists an asymmetry between the timing of buyers’
bids (they are all simultaneously submitted at the beginning of the Bertrand competition
subgame) and the timing of each seller’s choice of the bid to accept (sellers choose their most
preferred bid sequentially in a given order). This implies that, while in equilibrium it is pos-
sible that a seller’s choice between two identical bids is uniquely determined, this is no longer
true following a deviation by a buyer whose bid in equilibrium is selected at an earlier stage of
the subgame. To prevent sellers from deviating when choosing among identical bids following
6See Felli and Roberts (2001) for a discussion of the case in which sellers select their bids in the order of
any permutation of the sellers’ identities (1, . . . , T ).
7The dynamic version of the same equilibrium notion has been used in the analysis of Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996).
8This modification of the extensive form is equivalent to a Bertrand competition model in which there
exists an indivisible smallest possible unit of a bid (a penny) so that each buyer can break any tie by bidding
one penny more than his opponent if he wishes to do so.
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a buyer’s deviation — that possibly does not even affect the equilibrium bids submitted to
the seller in question — we chose to modify the extensive form in the way described above.
4. Bertrand Competition
We now proceed to characterize the equilibria of the model described in Section 3 above
solving it backwards. We start from the characterization of the equilibrium of the Bertrand
competition subgame, taking the investments, and hence the qualities of both sellers and
buyers, as given.
To simplify the analysis below let τn be the quality of seller n, n = 1, . . . , T , that, as
described in Section 3 above, is the n-th seller to choose her most preferred bid. The vector
of sellers’ qualities is then (τ1, . . . , τT ).
We first show that all the equilibria of the Bertrand competition subgame exhibit positive
assortative matching. In other words, for given investments, matches are efficient: the buyer
characterized by the k-th highest quality matches with the seller characterized by the k-th
highest quality.
Lemma 1: Every equilibrium of the Bertrand competition subgame is such that every pair
of equilibrium matches (σ′, τi) and (σ′′, τj), i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T} satisfies the property: If τi > τj
then σ′ > σ′′.
The proof of this result (in the Appendix) is a direct consequence of the complementarity
assumption of buyers’ and sellers’ qualities. Notice that Lemma 1 does not imply that the
order of sellers’ qualities, which are endogenously determined by sellers’ investments, coincides
with the order of sellers’ identities (innate abilities).
Using Lemma 1, we can now label buyers’ qualities in a way that is consistent with the way
sellers’ qualities are labelled. Indeed, Lemma 1 defines an equilibrium relationship between
the quality of each buyer and the quality of each seller. We can therefore denote σn, n =
1, . . . , T the quality of the buyer that in equilibrium matches with seller τn. Furthermore, we
denote σT+1, . . . , σS the qualities of the buyers that in equilibrium are not matched with any
seller and assume that these qualities are ordered so that σi > σi+1 for all i = T +1, . . . , S−1.
Consider stage t of the Bertrand competition subgame, characterized by the fact that the
seller of quality τt chooses her most preferred bid. The buyers that are still unmatched at this
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stage of the subgame are the ones with qualities σt, σt+1, . . . , σS.
9 We define the runner-up
buyer to the seller of quality τt to be the buyer, among the ones with qualities σt+1, . . . , σS,
who has the highest willingness to pay for a match with seller τt. This willingness to pay is
the difference between the surplus of the match between the runner-up buyer and the seller
in question and the payoff the runner-up buyer obtains if he is not successful in his bid to
the seller. We denote this buyer r(t) and his quality σr(t). Clearly r(t) > t.
This definition can be used recursively so as to define the runner-up buyer to the seller
that is matched in equilibrium with the runner-up buyer to the seller of quality τt. We denote
this buyer r2(t) = r(r(t)) and his quality σr2(t): r
2(t) > r(t) > t. In an analogous way we can
then denote rk(t) = r(rk−1(t)) for every k = 1, . . . , ρt where rk(t) > rk−1(t), r1(t) = r(t) and
σrρt (t) is the quality of the last buyers in the chain of runner-ups to the seller of quality τt.
We have now all the elements necessary to provide a characterization of the equilibrium
of the Bertrand competition subgame. In particular we first identify the runner-up buyer to
every seller and the difference equation satisfied by the equilibrium payoffs to all sellers and
buyers. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The runner-up buyer to the seller of quality τt, t = 1, . . . , T , is the buyer of
quality σr(t) such that:
σr(t) = max {σi | i = t+ 1, . . . , S and σi ≤ σt} . (1)
Further, the equilibrium payoffs to each buyer, piBσt and each seller, pi
S
τt , are such that for every
t = 1, . . . , T :
piBσt = [v(σt, τt)− v(σr(t), τt)] + piBσr(t) (2)
piSτt = v(σr(t), τt) − piBσr(t) (3)
and for every i = T + 1, . . . , S:
piBσi = 0 (4)
Notice that equation (1) identifies the runner-up buyer of the seller of quality τt as the buyer
— other than the one of quality σt that in equilibrium matches with seller τt — who has
the highest quality among the buyers with quality lower than σt that are still unmatched at
stage t of the Bertrand competition subgame. For any seller of quality τt it is then possible to
9Notice that given the notation defined above it is not necessarily the case that σt > σt+1 > . . . > σT .
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construct a chain of runner-up buyers: each one is the runner-up buyer to the seller that, in
equilibrium, is matched with the runner-up buyer that is next ahead in the chain. Equation
(1) implies that for every seller the last buyer in the chain of runner-up buyers is the buyer
of quality σT+1. This is the highest quality buyer among the ones that in equilibrium do not
match with any seller. In other words every chain of runner-up buyers has at least one buyer
in common.
Given that buyers Bertrand compete for sellers, each seller will not be able to capture all
the match surplus but only her outside option which is determined by the willingness to pay
of the runner-up buyer to the seller. This is the difference between the surplus of the match
between the runner-up buyer and the seller in question and the payoff the runner-up buyer
obtains in equilibrium if he is not successful in his bid to the seller: the difference equation in
(3). Given that the quality of the runner-up buyer is lower than the quality of the buyer the
seller is matched with in equilibrium, the share of the surplus each seller is able to capture
does not coincide with the entire surplus of the match. The payoff to each buyer is then the
difference between the surplus of the match and the runner-up buyer’s bid: the difference
equation in (2). The characterization of the equilibrium of the Bertrand competition subgame
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For any given vector of sellers’ qualities (τ1, . . . , τT ) and corresponding vec-
tor of buyers’ qualities (σ1, . . . , σS), the unique equilibrium of the Bertrand competition
subgame is such that every pair of equilibrium matches (σi, τi) and (σj, τj), i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T},
is such that:
If τi > τj then σi > σj. (5)
Further, the equilibrium shares of the match surplus that each buyer of quality σt and
each seller of quality τt, t = 1, . . . , T , receive are such that:
piBσt = [v(σt, τt) − v(σr(t), τt)] +
+
ρt∑
k=1
[
v(σrk(t), τrk(t))− v(σrk+1(t), τrk(t))
] (6)
piSτt = v(σr(t), τt) −
ρt∑
k=1
[
v(σrk(t), τrk(t))− v(σrk+1(t), τrk(t))
]
(7)
where rρt(t) = T + 1 and v(σrρt (t), τrρt (t)) = v(σrρt+1(t), τrρt (t)) = 0.
Consider the special case in which the order of sellers’ qualities coincides with the order of
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their innate abilities. This implies that sellers select their most preferred bid in the decreasing
order of their qualities: τ1 > . . . > τT . From Lemma 2 — condition (1) — this also implies
that the runner-up buyer to the seller of quality τt is the buyer of quality σt+1 for every
t = 1, . . . , T . The following corollary of Proposition 1 specifies the equilibrium of the Bertrand
competition subgame in this case.
Corollary 1: For any given ordered vector of sellers’ qualities (τ1, . . . , τT ) such that τ1 >
. . . > τT and corresponding vector of buyers’ qualities (σ1, . . . , σS) the unique equilibrium
of the Bertrand competition subgame is such that the equilibrium matches are (σk, τk), k =
1, . . . , T and the shares of the match surplus that each buyer of quality σt and each seller of
quality τt receive are such that:
piBσt =
T∑
h=t
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)] (8)
piSτt = v(σt+1, τt)−
T∑
h=t+1
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)] (9)
The main difference between Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 can be described as fol-
lows. Consider the subgame in which the seller of quality τt chooses among her bids and
let (τ1, . . . , τT ) be an ordered vector of qualities as in Proposition 1. This implies that
σt > σt+1 > σt+2. The runner-up buyer to the seller with quality τt is then the buyer of
quality σt+1 and the willingness to pay of this buyer (hence the share of the surplus accruing
to seller τt) is, from (3) above:
v(σt+1, τt)− piBσt+1 . (10)
Notice further that since the runner-up buyer to seller τt+1 is σt+2 from (2) above the payoff
to the buyer of quality σt+1 is:
piBσt+1 = v(σt+1, τt+1)− v(σt+2, τt+1) + piBσt+2 . (11)
Substituting (11) into (10) we obtain that the willingness to pay of the runner-up buyer σt+1
is then:
v(σt+1, τt)− v(σt+1, τt+1) + v(σt+2, τt+1)− piBσt+2 . (12)
Consider now a new vector of sellers qualities (τ1, . . . , τ
′
t−1, τt, τ
′
t+1, . . . , τT ) where the qualities
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τi for every i different from t − 1 and t + 1 are the same as the ones in the ordered vector
(τ1, . . . , τT ). Assume that τ
′
t−1 = τt+1 < τt and τ
′
t+1 = τt−1 > τt. This assumption implies
that the vector of buyers’ qualities (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
S) differs from the ordered vector of buyers
qualities (σ1, . . . , σS) only in its (t − 1)-th and (t + 1)-th components that are such that:
σ′t−1 = σt+1 < σt and σ
′
t+1 = σt−1 > σt. From (1) above we have that the runner-up buyer
for seller τt is now buyer σt+2 and the willingness to pay of this buyer is:
v(σt+2, τt)− piBσt+2 . (13)
Comparing (12) with (13) we obtain, by the complementarity assumption v12(σ, τ) > 0, that
v(σt+1, τt)− v(σt+1, τt+1) + v(σt+2, τt+1) > v(σt+2, τt).
In other words, the willingness to pay of the runner-up buyer to seller τt in the case
considered in Corollary 1 is strictly greater than the willingness to pay of the runner-up
buyer to seller τt in the special case of Proposition 1 we just considered. The reason is that,
in the latter case, there is one less buyer σt+1 to actively compete for the match with seller
τt.
This comparison is generalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Let (τ1, . . . , τT ) be an ordered vector of sellers qualities so that τ1 > . . . > τT
and (τ ′1, . . . , τ
′
T ) be any permutation of the vector (τ1, . . . , τT ) with the same t-th element:
τ ′t = τt such that there exists an i < t that permutes into a τ
′
j, (τi = τ
′
j), with j > t. Denote
(σ1, . . . , σT ) and (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
T ) the corresponding vectors of buyers’ qualities. Then seller τt’s
payoff, as in (9), is greater than seller τ ′t ’s payoff, as in (7):
v(σt+1, τt) −
T∑
h=t+1
[v(σh, τh) − v(σh+1, τh)]
> v(σ′r(t), τ
′
t) −
ρ′t∑
k=1
[
v(σ′rk(t), τ
′
rk(t)) − v(σ′rk+1(t), τ ′rk(t))
] (14)
Proposition 2 allows us to conclude that when sellers select their preferred bid in the decreas-
ing order of their qualities, competition among buyers for each match is at its peak.10 This
10Notice that all unmatched buyers with a strictly positive willingness to pay for the match with a given
seller submit their bids in equilibrium.
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is apparent when we consider the case in which the order in which sellers select their most
preferred bid is the increasing order of their qualities: τ1 < . . . < τT . In this case, according
to (1) above, the runner-up buyer to each seller has quality σT+1. This implies that the payoff
to each seller t = 1, . . . , T is:
piSτt = v(σT+1, τt) (15)
In this case only two buyers — the buyer of quality σt and the buyer of quality σT+1 —
actively compete for the match with seller τt and sellers’ payoffs are at their minimum.
We assume that sellers choose their most preferred bid in the decreasing order of their
innate ability. Notice that this does not necessarily mean that sellers choose their most
preferred bid in the decreasing order of their qualities τ1 > . . . > τT and hence competition
among buyers is at its peak. Indeed, sellers’ qualities are endogenously determined in what
follows.
We conclude this section by observing that from Proposition 1 above, the buyer’s equilib-
rium payoff piBσt is the sum of the social surplus produced by the equilibrium match v(σt, τt)
and an expression Bσt that does not depend on the quality σt of the buyer involved in the
match. In particular, this implies that Bσt does not depend on the match-specific investment
of the buyer of quality σt:
piBσt = v(σt, τt) + Bσt . (16)
Moreover, from (7), each seller’s equilibrium payoff piSτt is also the sum of the surplus
generated by the inefficient (if it occurs) match of the seller of quality τt with the runner-up
buyer of quality σr(t) and an expression Sτt that does not depend on the investment of the
seller of quality τt:
piSτt = v(σr(t), τt) + Sτt . (17)
Of course, when sellers select their bids in the decreasing order of their qualities the runner-
up buyer to seller t is the buyer of quality σt+1, from (1) above. Therefore, equation (17)
becomes:
piSτt = v(σt+1, τt) + Sτt . (18)
These conditions play a crucial role when we analyze the efficiency of the investment choices
of both buyers and sellers.
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5. Sellers’ investments
We now move back one period and consider the buyers’ and sellers’ simultaneous-move in-
vestment game.
In this Section we derive the sellers’ best reply and we provide a partial characterization
of the equilibrium in which we focus exclusively on the sellers’ investment choices. We
therefore take the qualities of buyers as given by the following ordered vector (σ(1), . . . , σ(S))
and determine the sellers’ ex-ante optimal investment choices given their identities
Notice that in characterizing the sellers’ investment choices we cannot bluntly apply Corol-
lary 1 as the characterization of the equilibrium of the Bertrand competition subgame. Indeed,
the order in which sellers choose among bids in this subgame is determined by the sellers’ in-
nate abilities rather than by their qualities. This implies that, unless sellers’ qualities (which
are endogenously determined) have the same order of sellers’ innate abilities, it is possible
that sellers do not choose among bids in the decreasing order of their marginal contribution
to a match (at least off the equilibrium path).
For a given level of buyer’s investment xs, denote y(t, s) the efficient investment of seller
t when matched with the buyer of quality σ(s) defined as:
y(t, s) = argmax
y
v(σ(s), τ(t, y))− C(y) (19)
We can now state the following property of the sellers’ investment game.
Proposition 3: In every equilibrium of the investment game the sellers’ optimal choice of
investments are such that seller t chooses investment y(t, t+ 1), as defined in (19).
Proposition 3 implies two different features of the sellers’ optimal investment choice. First,
the sellers under-invest. The nature of the Bertrand competition game is such that each seller
is not able to capture all the match surplus but only the outside option that is determined by
the willingness to pay of the runner-up buyer for the match. Since the match between a seller
and her runner-up buyer yields a match surplus that is strictly lower than the equilibrium
surplus produced by the same seller the share of the surplus the seller is able to capture does
not coincide with the entire surplus of the match.
Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 15
Corollary 2: Each seller t = 1, . . . , T chooses an inefficient investment level y(t, t+ 1). The
investment y(t, t + 1) is strictly lower than the investment y(t, t) that would be efficient for
seller t to choose given the equilibrium match of buyer t with seller t.
Second, the order of the sellers qualities τ(t, y(t, t + 1)) coincides with the order of the
sellers’ innate abilities t. Two features of the sellers’ investment decision explain this result.
First, each seller’s payoff is completely determined by the seller’s outside option and hence
independent of the identity and quality of the buyer with whom he is matched. Second, sellers
choose their bid in the decreasing order of their innate abilities and this order is independent
of sellers’ investments. These two features of the model, together with positive assortative
matching (Lemma 1 above), imply that when a seller chooses an investment that yields a
quality higher than the one with higher innate ability, it modifies the set of unmatched buyers,
and hence of bids from among which the seller chooses, only by changing the bid of the buyer
whom the seller will be matched with in equilibrium. Hence, this change will not affect the
outside option and payoff of this seller, implying that the optimal investment cannot exceed
the optimal investment of the seller with higher innate ability. Therefore seller’s have no
incentive to modify the order of their innate ability at an ex-ante stage.
6. Buyers’ Investments
In this section we derive the buyers’ optimal investments. We take the quality of sellers
τ1 > . . . > τT to be given and, from Proposition 3, to coincide with the order of the sellers’
innate ability and derive the buyers’ optimal choice of investment given their own identity
(innate ability). Corollary 1 provides the characterization of the unique equilibrium of the
Bertrand competition subgame in this case.
In the Section that follows, we first show that it is possible to construct buyers’ investments
that lead to an efficient equilibrium of the investment game: the order of the induced qualities
σ(s, xs), s = 1, . . . , S, coincides with the order of the buyers’ identities s, s = 1, . . . , S. We
then show that it is possible to construct buyers’ investments that lead to inefficient equilibria,
such that the order of the buyers’ identities differs from the order of their induced qualities.
Notice that each buyer’s investment choice is constrained efficient given the equilibrium
match and the quality of the seller with whom the buyer is matched. Indeed, the Bertrand
competition game will make each buyer residual claimant of the surplus produced in his
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equilibrium match. Therefore, the buyer is able to appropriate the marginal returns from his
investment and so his investment choice is constrained efficient given the equilibrium match.
Assume that the equilibrium match is the one between the s buyer and the t seller.
From equation (16), buyer s’s optimal investment choice xs(t) is the solution to the following
problem:
xs(t) = argmax
x
piBσ(s,x) − C(x) = v(σ(s, x), τt)− Bσ(s,x) − C(x). (20)
This investment choice is defined by the following necessary and sufficient first order condi-
tions of problem (20):
v1(σ(s, xs(t)), τt) σ2(s, xs(t)) = C
′(xs(t)). (21)
where C ′(·) is the first derivative of the cost function C(·).
Notice that (21) follows from the fact that Bσ(s,x) does not depend on buyer s’s quality
σ(s, x), and hence on buyer s’s match specific investment x.
The following result characterizes the properties of buyer s’s investment choice xs(t) and
his quality σ(s, xs(t)).
Proposition 4: For any given equilibrium match (σ(s, xs(t)), τt), buyer s’s investment choice
xs(t), as defined in (21), is constrained efficient.
Furthermore, buyer s’s optimally chosen quality σ(s, xs(t)) decreases both in the buyer’s
identity s and in the seller identity t:
d σ(s, xs(t))
d s
< 0,
d σ(s, xs(t))
d t
< 0. (22)
7. Equilibria
In this section we characterize the set of equilibria of the investment game. We first define
an equilibrium of this game. Let (s1, . . . , sS) denote a permutation of the vector of buyers’
identities (1, . . . , S). An equilibrium of the investment game is a set of sellers’ optimal
investment choices y(t, t+1) as in Proposition 3 above, and a set of buyers’ optimal investment
choices xsi(i), as defined in (21) above, such that the resulting buyers’ qualities have the same
order as the identity of the associated sellers:
σ(si, xsi(i)) = σi < σ(si−1, xsi−1(i− 1)) = σi−1 ∀i = 2, . . . , S, (23)
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where σi denotes the i-th element of the equilibrium ordered vector of qualities (σ1, . . . , σS).
11
Notice that this equilibrium definition allows for the order of buyers’ identities to differ
from the order of their qualities and therefore from the order of the identities of the sellers
with whom each buyer is matched.
We proceed to show the existence of an efficient equilibrium of our model. This is the equi-
librium of the investment game such that the order of buyers’ qualities coincides with the or-
der of buyers’ identities. From Lemma 1 the efficient equilibrium matches are (σ(t, xt(t)), τt),
t = 1, . . . , T .
Proposition 5: The equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game characterized by si = i,
i = 1, . . . , S, always exists and is efficient.
The intuitive argument behind this result is simple to describe. The payoff to buyer i,
piBi (σ)−C(x(i, σ)), changes as buyer i matches with a higher quality seller, brought about by
increased investment.12 However, the payoff is continuous at any point, such as σi−1, where,
in the continuation Bertrand game, the buyer matches with a different seller.13 However, if
the equilibrium considered is the efficient one — si = i for every i = 1, . . . , S — the payoff to
buyer i is monotonic decreasing in any interval to the right of the (σi+1, σi−1) and increasing
in any interval to the left. Therefore, this payoff has a unique global maximum. Hence buyer
i has no incentive to deviate and change his investment choice.
If instead we consider an inefficient equilibrium — an equilibrium where s1, . . . , sS differs
from 1, . . . , S — then the payoff to buyer i is still continuous at any point, such as σ(si, xsi(i)),
in which in the continuation Bertrand game the buyer gets matched with a different seller.
However, this payoff is no longer monotonic decreasing in any interval to the right of the
(σ(si+1, xsi+1(i + 1)), σ(si−1, xsi−1(i − 1))) and increasing in any interval to the left. In par-
ticular, this payoff is increasing at least in the right neighborhood of the switching points
11Recall that since τ1 > . . . > τT Lemma 1 and the notation defined in Section 4 above imply that
σ1 > . . . > σS .
12The level of investment x(i, σ) is defined, as in the Appendix: σ(i, x) ≡ σ.
13Indeed, from (A.35) and (A.36) we get that
∂[piBi (σ
−
i−1)−C(x(i,σ−i−1))]
∂σ = v1(σi−1, τi) − C
′(x(i,σi−1))
σ2(i,x(i,σi−1))
and
∂[piBi (σ
+
i−1)−C(x(i,σ+i−1))]
∂σ = v1(σi−1, τi−1) − C
′(x(i,σi−1))
σ2(i,x(i,σi−1))
. Therefore, from v12(σ, τ) > 0, we conclude that
∂[piBi (σ
+
i−1)−C(x(i,σ+i−1))]
∂σ >
∂[piBi (σ
−
i−1)−C(x(i,σ−i−1))]
∂σ .
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σ(sh, xsh(h)) for h = 1, . . . , i − 1 and decreasing in the left neighborhood of the switching
points σ(sk, xsk(k)) for k = i+ 1, . . . , N .
This implies that, depending on the values of parameters, these inefficient equilibria may
or may not exist. We show below that it is possible to construct inefficient equilibria if
two buyers’ qualities are close enough. Alternatively, for given buyers’ qualities, inefficient
equilibria do not exist if the sellers qualities are close enough.
Proposition 6: Given any vector of sellers’ quality functions (τ(1, ·), . . . , τ(T, ·)), it is pos-
sible to construct an inefficient equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game such that there
exists at least an i that satisfies si < si−1.
Moreover, given any vector of buyers’ quality functions (σ(s1, ·), . . . , σ(sS, ·)), it is possible
to construct an ordered vector of sellers’ quality functions (τ(1, ·), . . . , τ(T, ·)) such that there
does not exist any inefficient equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game.
The intuition of why such result holds is simple to highlight. The continuity of each
buyer’s payoff implies that, when two buyers have similar innate abilities, exactly as it is not
optimal for each buyer to deviate when he is matched efficiently it is also not optimal for
him to deviate when he is inefficiently assigned to a match. Indeed, the difference in buyers’
qualities is almost entirely determined by the difference in the qualities of the sellers with
whom they are matched rather than by the difference in buyers’ innate abilities. This implies
that, when the buyer of low ability has undertaken a high investment with the purpose of
being matched with a better seller, it is not worth the buyer of immediately higher ability
to try to outbid him. The willingness to pay of the lower ability buyer for the match with
the better seller is in fact enhanced by this higher investment. Therefore the gains from
outbidding this buyer do not justify the high investment of the higher ability buyer. Indeed,
in the Bertrand competition game, each buyer is able to capture just the difference between
the match surplus and the willingness to pay for the match of the runner-up buyer who would
be, in this outbidding attempt, the low ability buyer that undertook the high investment.
Conversely, if sellers’ qualities are similar then the difference in buyers’ qualities is almost
entirely determined by the difference in buyers’ innate abilities implying that it is not possible
to construct an inefficient equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game. In this case, the
improvement in the buyer’s incentives to invest due to a matching with a better seller are
more than compensated by the decrease in the buyer’s incentives induced by the lower innate
ability of the buyer.
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We conclude that buyers’ investments are constrained efficient while sellers underinvest.
It might seem at first sight that an envelope condition would ensure that the inefficiency
associated with any seller’s investment choice is small. Under concavity restrictions, we
would expect the marginal decisions of the seller to lead to less inefficiency than if it had
been the decision of any other seller. This argument suggest the result that the extent of
total underinvestment inefficiency in the market is bounded by what could be created from
one seller (the most efficient one) choosing the level of investment appropriate for a match
with the best unmatched buyer.14 However, the complementarities that exist between buyers
and sellers could still lead to the inefficiency created by a single seller being large. The lowest
quality seller chooses an investment which would have been efficient if he had been matched
with the buyer that is unmatched; this buyer will choose not to invest. The complementarity
effect may be strong enough to ensure that the seller would choose zero investment. This in
turn will lead the buyer that is matched with this seller to also choose a zero investment.
This gives zero investment incentives to the second lowest seller, and so on. It is then possible
to construct an equilibrium where no investment occurs and inefficiencies are maximized.
8. Concluding Remarks
When buyers and sellers can undertake heterogenous investments, Bertrand competition for
matches yields a number of inefficiencies. In particular, sellers underinvest but select efficient
matches. The interaction of buyers and sellers can lead to the aggregate extent of this
inefficiency being large. Buyers choose constrained efficient investments but it is possible to
construct equilibria in which buyers end up in inefficient matches: the order of the buyers’
induced qualities differs from the order of their innate abilities.
Understanding the implications of competition for the hold up problem and coordination
failures helps in identifying the inefficiencies present in the concrete applications mentioned
above. For example, it might clarify why the relationship between suppliers and manufac-
turers in the German car manufacturing industry is not only characterized by a level of
competition among a possibly small number of suppliers for each innovative part but also
by the presence of long term relational contracts among suppliers and manufacturers that
reduce the residual inefficiencies identified in our analysis above.
14See Felli and Roberts (2001) for the formal statement and proof of this result
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One assumption is critical in our analysis. Sellers choose their most preferred bid in
the order of their innate ability. In Felli and Roberts (2001) we analyze the effect of this
assumption in two models: one where only sellers undertake ex-ante investments and one
where only buyers undertake ex-ante investment.
In these models, we characterize the equilibria when sellers select their most preferred
bid in an arbitrary order. We show that competition among buyers is not as intense as in
the model analyzed here, leading to a higher underinvestment on the part of the sellers as
well as to the possibility that equilibrium matches are inefficient on the sellers’ side: the
order of the sellers’ induced qualities may differ from the order of their innate abilities. We
then endogenize the order in which sellers select their match by letting sellers bid for their
position in the queue. We show that in this case the equilibrium order will coincide with the
decreasing order of the sellers’ innate abilities, the one analyzed above.
The extensive form of our matching game plays a critical role. One could envisage a double
auction model where both buyers and sellers make bids. Depending upon the particular
equilibrium that results, the different inefficiencies that we have highlighted above will be
shared by both sides of the market with underinvestments and coordination failures being a
feature of the equilibrium investments of buyers and sellers.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume by way of contradiction that equilibrium matches are not assortative: there
exist a pair of equilibrium matches (σ′′, τi) and (σ′, τj) such that τi > τj , and σ′ > σ′′. Denote b(τi),
respectively b(τj), the bids that in equilibrium the seller of quality τi, respectively of quality τj , accepts.
Consider first the match (σ′′, τi). For this match to occur in equilibrium we need that it is not optimal for
the buyer of quality σ′′ to match with the seller of quality τj rather than τi. If buyer σ′′ deviates and does not
submit a bid that will be selected by seller τi then two situations may occur, depending on whether the seller
of quality τi chooses her bid before, (i < j), or after (i > j), the seller of quality τj . In particular if τi chooses
her bid before τj then following the deviation of the buyer of quality σ
′′ a different buyer will be matched
with seller τi. Then the competition for the seller of quality τi+1 will be won either by the same buyer as in
the absence of the deviation or, if that buyer has already been matched, by another buyer who now would
not be bidding for subsequent sellers. Repeating this argument for subsequent sellers we conclude that when
following a deviation by buyer σ′′ it is the turn of the seller of quality τj to choose her most preferred bid,
the set of unmatched buyers, excluding buyer σ′′, is depleted of exactly one buyer, compared with the set
of unmatched buyers when in equilibrium the seller of quality τj chooses her most preferred bid. Hence the
maximum bids of these buyers bˆ(τj) cannot be higher than the equilibrium bid b(τj) of the buyer of quality
σ′: bˆ(τj) ≤ b(τj).15
Therefore for (σ′′, τi) to be an equilibrium match we need that
v(σ′′, τi)− b(τi) ≥ v(σ′′, τj)− bˆ(τj) (A.1)
or given that, as argued above, bˆ(τj) ≤ b(τj) we need that the following necessary condition is satisfied:
v(σ′′, τi)− b(τi) ≥ v(σ′′, τj)− b(τj) (A.2)
Alternatively if τi chooses her bid after τj then for (σ
′′, τi) to be an equilibrium match we need that
buyer σ′′ does not find it optimal to deviate and outbid the buyer of quality σ′ by submitting bid b(τj). This
equilibrium condition therefore coincides with (A.2) above.
Consider now the equilibrium match (σ′, τj). For this match to occur in equilibrium we need that the
buyer of quality σ′ does not want to deviate and be matched with the seller of quality τi rather than τj .
15Notice that we can conclude that following a deviation by buyer σ′′ the bid accepted by seller τj is not
higher than b(τj) since, as discussed in Section 3 above, we allow buyers to specify in their bid that they
are willing to increase such a bid if necessary. Moreover we restrict the strategy used by each seller so as to
put higher order probabilities on the bids that contain this proviso. In the absence of these restrictions it is
possible to envisage a situation in which following a deviation by buyer σ′′ the sellers that select their bid
after seller τi and before seller τj may no longer choose among equal bids the one submitted by the buyer
with the highest willingness to pay. The result is then that the bid accepted by seller τj following a deviation
might actually be higher than b(τj). Notice that this problem disappears if we assume that there exists a
smallest indivisible unit of a bid (see also Footnote 8 above).
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As discussed above, depending on whether the seller of quality τj chooses her bid before, (j < i), or after,
(j > i), the seller of quality τi, the following is a necessary condition for (σ
′, τj) to be an equilibrium match:
v(σ′, τj)− b(τj) ≥ v(σ′, τi)− b(τi). (A.3)
The inequalities (A.2) and (A.3) imply:
v(σ′′, τi) + v(σ′, τj) ≥ v(σ′, τi) + v(σ′′, τj). (A.4)
Condition (A.4) contradicts the complementarity assumption v12(σ, τ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume all sellers and all buyers have different induced quality. We proceed by
induction on the number of sellers still to be matched. Without any loss in generality, take S = T + 1.
Consider the (last) stage T of the Bertrand competition game. In this stage only two buyers are unmatched
and from Lemma 1 have qualities σT and σT+1. Clearly the only possible runner-up to seller T is the buyer
of quality σT+1, and given that, by Lemma 1, σT > σT+1, the quality of this buyer satisfies (1).
Let b(σT ) and b(σT+1) denote the bids submitted to seller T by the two buyers with qualities σT and
σT+1. Seller T clearly chooses the highest of these two bids.
Buyer of quality σT+1 generates surplus v(σT+1, τT ) if selected by seller T while the buyer of quality σT
generates surplus v(σT , τT ) if selected. Hence, v(σT+1, τT ) is the maximum willingness to bid of the runner-up
buyer σT+1, while v(σT , τT ) is the maximum willingness to bid of the buyer of quality σT . Notice that from
σT > σT+1 and v1(σ, τ) > 0 we have: v(σT , τT ) > v(σT+1, τT ). Buyer σT therefore submits a bid equal to
the minimum necessary to outbid buyer σT+1. Buyer σT+1, on his part, has an incentive to deviate and
outbid buyer σT for any bid b(σT ) < v(σT+1, τT ). Therefore the unique equilibrium is such that both buyers’
equilibrium bids are:16 b(σT ) = b(σT+1) = v(σT+1, τT ).
Consider now the stage t < T of the Bertrand competition game. The induction hypothesis is that the
runner-up buyer for every seller of quality τt+1, . . . , τT is defined in (1) above. Further, the shares of surplus
accruing to the sellers of qualities τj , j = t+ 1, . . . , T and to the buyers of qualities σj , j = t+ 1, . . . , S are:
pˆiBσj = [v(σj , τj)− v(σr(j), τj)] + pˆiBσr(j) (A.5)
pˆiSτj = v(σr(j), τj)− pˆiBσr(j) . (A.6)
From Lemma 1, the buyer of quality σt will match with the seller of quality τt which implies that the
runner-up buyer for seller τt has to be one of the buyers with qualities σt+1, . . . , σT+1. Each buyer will bid
an amount for every seller which gives him the same payoff as he receives in equilibrium. To prove that the
16This is just one of a whole continuum of subgame perfect equilibria of this simple Bertrand game but is
the unique cautious equilibrium.
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quality of the runner-up buyer satisfies (1) we need to rule out that the quality of the runner-up buyer is
σr(t) > σt and, if σr(t) ≤ σt, that there exist another buyer of quality σi ≤ σt such that i > t and σi > σr(t).
Assume first, by way of contradiction, that σr(t) > σt. Then the willingness to pay of the runner-up buyer
for the match with seller τt is the difference between the surplus generated by the match of the runner-up
buyer of quality σr(t) and the seller of quality τt minus the payoff that the buyer would get according to the
induction hypothesis by moving to stage r(t) of the Bertrand competition game:
v(σr(t), τt)− pˆiBσr(t) . (A.7)
From the induction hypothesis, (A.5), we get that the payoff pˆiBσr(t) is:
pˆiBσr(t) = v(σr(t), τr(t))− v(σr2(t), τr(t)) + pˆiBσr2(t) (A.8)
where, from the induction hypothesis, σr2(t) < σr(t). Substituting (A.8) into (A.7) we get that the willingness
to pay of a runner-up buyer of quality σr(t) for the match with the seller of quality τt can be written as:
v(σr(t), τt)− v(σr(t), τr(t)) + v(σr2(t), τr(t))− pˆiBσr2(t) . (A.9)
Consider now the willingness to pay of the buyer of quality σr2(t) for the match with the same seller of quality
τt. This is
v(σr2(t), τt)− pˆiBσr2(t) . (A.10)
By definition of runner-up buyer the willingness to pay of the buyer of quality σr(t), as in (A.9), must be
greater or equal than the willingness to pay of the buyer of quality σr2(t) as in (A.10). This inequality is
satisfied if and only if:
v(σr(t), τt) + v(σr2(t), τr(t)) ≥ v(σr(t), τr(t)) + v(σr2(t), τt). (A.11)
Since σr(t) > σt then, from Lemma 1, τr(t) > τt. The latter inequality together with σr(t) > σr2(t) allow us
to conclude that (A.11) is a contradiction to the complementarity assumption v12(σ, τ) > 0.
Assume now, by way of contradiction, that σr(t) ≤ σt but there exists another buyer of quality σi ≤ σt
such that i > t and σi > σr(t). The definition of runner-up buyer implies that his willingness to pay, as in
(A.7), for the match with the seller of quality τt is greater than the willingness to pay v(σi, τt) − pˆiBσi of the
buyer of quality σi, for the same match:
v(σr(t), τt)− pˆiBσr(t) ≥ v(σi, τt)− pˆiBσi . (A.12)
Moreover, for (σr(t), τr(t)) to be an equilibrium match buyer σr(t) should have no incentive to be matched
with seller τi instead. This implies, using an argument identical to the one presented in the proof of Lemma
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1, that the following necessary condition needs to be satisfied:
pˆiBσr(t) = v(σr(t), τr(t))− b(τr(t)) ≥ v(σr(t), τi)− b(τi); (A.13)
where b(τr(t)) and b(τi) are the equilibrium bids accepted by seller τr(t), respectively τi. Further, the equilib-
rium payoff to buyer σi is:
pˆiBσi = v(σi, τi)− b(τi). (A.14)
Substituting (A.13) and (A.14) into (A.12) we obtain that for (A.12) to hold the following necessary condition
needs to be satisfied:
v(σr(t), τt) + v(σi, τi) ≥ v(σi, τt) + v(σr(t), τi). (A.15)
Since, by assumption, σt ≥ σi from Lemma 1, τt > τi. The latter inequality together with σi > σr(t) imply
that (A.15) is a contradiction to the complementarity assumption v12(σ, τ) > 0. This concludes the proof
that the quality of the runner-up buyer for seller τt satisfies (1).
An argument similar to the one used in the analysis of stage T of the Bertrand competition subgame
concludes the proof of Lemma 2 by showing that the buyer of quality σt submits in equilibrium a bid equal
to the willingness to pay of the runner-up buyer to seller τt as in (A.7). This bid is the equilibrium payoff to
the seller of quality τt and coincides with (3). The equilibrium payoff to the buyer of quality σt is then the
difference between the match surplus v(σt, τt) and the equilibrium bid in (A.7) as in (2).
Proof of Proposition 1: Condition (5) is nothing but a restatement of Lemma 1. The proof of (6) and
(7) follows directly from Lemma 2. In particular, solving recursively (2), using (4), we obtain (6); then
substituting (6) into (3) we obtain (7).
Proof of Corollary 1: This result follows directly from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. In
particular, (1) implies that when (τ1, . . . , τT ) and (σ1, . . . , σS) are ordered vectors of qualities σr(t) = σt+1
for every t = 1, . . . , T . Then substituting the identity of the runner-up buyer in (6) and (7) we obtain (8)
and (9).
Lemma A.1: Given any ordered vector of sellers’ qualities (τ1, . . . , τT ) and the corresponding vector of
buyers’ qualities (σ1, . . . , σS) we have that for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and every m = 1, . . . , T − t:
v(σt+1, τt)−
m∑
h=1
[v(σt+h, τt+h)− v(σt+h+1, τt+h)] > v(σt+m+1, τt) (A.16)
Proof: We proceed by induction. In the case m = 1 inequality (A.16) becomes:
v(σt+1, τt)− v(σt+1, τt+1) + v(σt+2, τt+1) > v(σt+2, τt)
which is satisfied by the complementarity assumption v12(σ, τ) > 0, given that σt+1 > σt+2 and τt > τt+1.
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Assume now that for every 1 ≤ n < m the following condition holds:
v(σt+1, τt)−
n∑
h=1
[v(σt+h, τt+h)− v(σt+h+1, τt+h)] > v(σt+n+1, τt) (A.17)
We need to show that (A.16) holds for m = n+ 1. Inequality (A.16) can be written as:
v(σt+1, τt) −
n∑
h=1
[v(σt+h, τt+h)− v(σt+h+1, τt+h)] −
− [v(σt+n+1, τt+n+1)− v(σt+n+2, τt+n+1)] > v(σt+n+2, τt)
(A.18)
Substituting the induction hypothesis (A.17) into (A.18) we obtain:
v(σt+1, τt) −
n∑
h=1
[v(σt+h, τt+h)− v(σt+h+1, τt+h)] −
− [v(σt+n+1, τt+n+1)− v(σt+n+2, τt+n+1)] >
> v(σt+n+1, τt)− v(σt+n+1, τt+n+1) + v(σt+n+2, τt+n+1)
(A.19)
Notice now that the complementarity assumption v12(σ, τ) > 0 and the inequalities σt+n+1 > σt+n+2, τt >
τt+n+1 imply:
v(σt+n+1, τt)− v(σt+n+1, τt+n+1) + v(σt+n+2, τt+n+1) > v(σt+n+2, τt) (A.20)
Substituting (A.20) into (A.19) we conclude that (A.16) holds for m = n+ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the vectors of runner-up buyers (σt, . . . , σT+1) and (σ
′
t, σ
′
r(t), . . . , σ
′
rρ
′
t (t)
).
From Lemma 1 and the assumption τ ′t = τt we get that σt = σ
′
t. Moreover from (1) we have that σT+1 = σ
′
rρ
′
t (t)
and there exists an index `(rk(t)) ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T + 1} such that σ`(rk(t)) = σ′rk(t) for every k = 0, . . . , ρ′t,
where r0(t) = t. In other words, the characterization of the runner-up buyer (1) implies that the elements
of the vector (σ′t, σ
′
r(t), . . . , σ
′
rρ
′
t (t)
) are a subset of the elements of the vector (σt, σt+1, . . . , σT+1). Lemma 1
then implies that τ`(rk(t)) = τ
′
rk(t) for every k = 0, . . . , ρ
′
t. Therefore we can rewrite the payoff to seller τ
′
t , as
in (7), in the following way:
v(σ`(r(t)), τ`(t)) −
ρ′t∑
k=1
[
v(σ`(rk(t)), τ`(rk(t))) − v(σ`(rk+1(t)), τ`(rk(t)))
]
. (A.21)
Define now δk to be an integer number such that `(r
k(t)) + δk = `(r
k+1(t)). Then Lemma A.1 implies that:
v(σ`(rk(t))+1, τ`(rk(t))) −
δk−1∑
h=1
[
v(σ`(rk(t))+h, τ`(rk(t))+h)− v(σ`(rk(t))+h+1, τ`(rk(t))+h)
]
>
> v(σ`(rk+1(t)), τ`(rk(t)))
(A.22)
for every k = 0, . . . , ρ′t − 1. Substituting (A.22) into (A.21) we obtain (14).
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Proof of Proposition 3: We prove this result in two steps. We first show that if sellers choose investments
y(t, t+ 1), for t = 1, . . . , T , (simple investments) then the order of sellers’ identities coincides with the order
of sellers’ qualities. Hence, Corollary 1 applies and the shares of the surplus accruing to each buyer and each
seller are the ones defined in (8) and (9) above.
Step 1: If each seller t chooses the simple investment y(t, t+ 1), as defined in (19), then
τ1 = τ(1, y(1, 2)) > . . . > τT = τ(T, y(T, T + 1)).
The proof follows from the fact that from the first order conditions of (19) we obtain:
dτ(t, y(t, s))
dt
=
v2 τ1 τ22 − τ1 C ′′ − v2 τ2 τ12
v22(τ2)2 + v2 τ22 − C ′′ < 0 (A.23)
and
dτ(t, y(t, s))
ds
=
v12(τ2)
2
v22(τ2)2 + v2 τ22 − C ′′ < 0 (A.24)
where (with an abuse of notation) we denote with τh and τhk, h, k ∈ {1, 2} the first and second order derivatives
of the quality functions τ(·, ·) computed at (t, y(t, s)). Moreover the first and second order derivative (vh and
vhk, h, k ∈ {1, 2}) of the functions v(·, ·) are computed at (σs, τ(t, y(t, s))) and C ′′ is evaluated at y(t, s).
We conclude the proof by showing that the sellers choice of best replies y(t, t+ 1) t+ 1, . . . , T are unique.
Step 2: The sellers’ unique best replies in the investment game are y(t, t+ 1) for every t = 1, . . . , T .
We start from seller T . In the T -th (the last) matching subgame of the Bertrand competition game all sellers,
but seller T , have selected a buyer’s bid. Denote τT the quality of this seller. Assume for simplicity that
S = T + 1. We use the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 1. In particular since we want to show
that seller T chooses a simple investment independently from the investment choice of the other sellers we
denote α(T ) and α(T+1) the qualities of the two buyers that are still un-matched in the T -th subgame, such
that α(T ) > α(T+1). Indeed, from Lemma 1 the identity of the two buyers left will depend on the order of
sellers’ qualities and therefore on the investment choices of the other (T − 1) sellers.
From Lemma 1 above we have that the buyer of quality α(T ) matches with seller T . Seller T ’s payoff is
v(α(T+1), τT ) while the payoff of the buyer of quality α(T ) is
[
v(α(T ), τT )− v(α(T+1), τT )
]
and the payoff of
the buyer of quality α(T+1) is zero.
Denote now a(T ), respectively a(T+1), the identity of the buyers of quality α(T ), respectively α(T+1):
a(T ) < a(T+1). Seller T ’s optimal investment yT is then defined as follows
yT = argmax
y
v(α(T + 1), τ(T, y))− C(y).
This implies that the optimal investment of seller T is the simple investment yT = y(T, a(T+1)), as defined in
(19), whatever is the pair of buyers left in the T -th subgame. If all other sellers undertake a simple investment
then from Step 1: a(T ) = T and a(T+1) = T + 1. Hence seller T ’s optimal investment is y(T, T + 1).
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Denote now t + 1, (t < T ), the last seller that undertakes a simple investment y(t + 1, t + 2). We then
show that seller t will choose a simple investment y(t, t+ 1). Consider the t-th subgame in which seller t has
to choose among the potential bids of the remaining (T − t + 2) buyers labelled a(t) < . . . < a(T+1), with
associated qualities α(t) > . . . > α(T+1), respectively.
17 From the assumption that every seller j = t+1, . . . , T
undertakes a simple investment y(j, a(j+1)) and Step 1 we obtain that τt+1 > . . . > τT .
We first show that the quality associated with seller t is such that τt > τt+1. Assume, by way of
contradiction, that seller t chooses investment y∗ that yields a quality τ∗ such that τj+1 ≤ τ∗ ≤ τj for some
j ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T − 1}. Then from Lemma 1 and (9) we have that seller t matches with buyer a(j) and seller
t’s payoff is:
ΠSτ∗ = v(α(j+1), τ(t, y
∗))−
T∑
h=j+1
[
v(α(h), τh)− v(α(h+1), τh)
]
(A.25)
where τ(t, y∗) = τ∗. From (A.25) we obtain that y∗ is then the solution to the following problem:
y∗ = argmax
y
v(α(j + 1), τ(t, y))− C(y). (A.26)
From the assumption that each seller j ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T} undertakes a simple investment and definition (19)
we also have that seller j’s investment choice y(j, a(j+1)) is defined as follows:
y(j, a(j+1)) = argmax
y
v(α(j + 1), τ(j, y))− C(y). (A.27)
Notice further that the payoff to seller t in (A.25) is continuous in τ∗. Indeed the limit for τ∗ that converges
from the right to τj is equal to
ΠSτj = v(α(j+1), τj)−
T∑
h=j+1
[
v(α(h), τh)− v(α(h+1), τh)
]
. (A.28)
If instead τj < τ
∗ ≤ τj−1 then from (9) the payoff to the seller with quality τ∗ is
ΠSτ∗ = v(α(j), τ
∗) − v(α(j), τj) + v(α(j+1), τj)−
T∑
h=j+1
[
v(α(h), τh)− v(α(h+1), τh)
]
.
Therefore the limit for τ∗ that converges to τj from the left is, from (8), equal to ΠSτj in (A.28). This proves
the continuity in τ∗ of the payoff function in (A.25). Continuity of the payoff function in (A.25) together
with definitions (A.26), (A.27) and condition (A.23) imply that y∗ > y(j, a(j+1)) or τ∗ > τj , a contradiction
to the hypothesis τ∗ ≤ τj .
We now show that seller t will choose a simple investment y(t, a(t+1)). From the result just obtained we
17Once again we want to show that seller t undertakes a simple investment independently of the investment
choice of sellers 1, . . . , t− 1 that, from Lemma 1, determines the exact identities of the un-matched buyers in
the t-th subgame of the Bertrand competition game.
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have τt > τt+1 > . . . > τT and the assumption that α(t) > . . . > α(S) are the qualities of the unmatched
buyers in the t-th subgame of the Bertrand competition game allow us to conclude, using (9) above, that the
payoff to seller t is:
ΠSτt = v(α(t+1), τt)−
T∑
h=t+1
[
v(α(h), τh)− v(α(h+1), τh)
]
(A.29)
Seller t’s investment choice is then the simple investment y(t, a(t+1)) defined as follows:
y(t, a(t+1)) = argmax
y
v(α(t+ 1), τ(t, y))− C(y). (A.30)
To conclude that a simple investment y(t, a(t+1)) is the unique solution to (A.30) we still need to show
that seller t has no incentive to deviate and choose an investment y∗, and hence a quality τ∗, that exceeds
the quality τk of one of the (t − 1) sellers that are already matched at the t-th subgame of the Bertrand
competition game: k < t. The reason why this choice of investment might be optimal for seller t is that
it changes the pool of buyers a(t), . . . , a(S) unmatched in subgame t. Of course this choice will change the
simple nature of seller t’s investment only if τk > τt+1. Indeed, we have already showed that if τk < τt+1 then
τt > τk and, from (A.30), seller t’s investment choice is yt(a(t+1)), a simple investment for any given set of
unmatched buyers.
Consider the following deviation by seller t: seller t chooses an investment y∗ > y(t, a(t+1)) that yields
quality τ∗ > τk > τt+1. Recall that Lemma 1 implies that the ranking of each seller in the ordered vector of
sellers’ qualities determines the buyer with whom each seller is matched. Hence, seller t’s deviation changes
the ranking and the matches of all sellers whose quality τ is smaller than τ∗ and greater than τt+1. However,
this deviation does not alter the ranking of the T − t sellers with identities (t + 1, . . . , T ) and qualities
(τt+1, . . . , τT ). Therefore, the only difference between the equilibrium set of un-matched buyers in the t-th
subgame and the set of un-matched buyers in the same subgame following seller t’s deviation is the identity
and quality of the buyer that matches with seller t.18 The remaining set of buyers’ identities and qualities
(α(t+1), . . . , α(S)) is unchanged. Hence, following seller t’s deviation, the un-matched buyers’ qualities are
α∗ > α(t+1) > . . . > α(T ), where α∗ is the quality of the buyer that according to Lemma 1 is matched with
seller t when the quality of this seller is τ∗. Equation (9) implies that seller t’s payoff following this deviation
is then:
ΠSτ∗ = v(α(t+1), τ
∗)−
T∑
h=t+1
[
v(α(h), τh)− v(α(h+1), τh)
]
(A.31)
Continuity of the payoff function in (A.30) together with (A.31) imply that seller t’s net payoff is maximized
at y(t, a(t+1)). Hence, seller t cannot gain from choosing an investment y
∗ > y(t, a(t+1)). This argument
holds for every t < T implying that all sellers choose a simple investment. Therefore a(t) = t and seller t’s
equilibrium investment choice is yt = y(t, t+ 1).
18All other sellers with identities (k, . . . , t− 1) whose match changed because of the deviation are already
matched in the t-th subgame of the Bertrand competition game.
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Proof of Corollary 2: The result follows from Proposition 3, the definition of efficient investment (19)
when buyer t matches with seller t, and condition (A.24).
Proof of Proposition 4: Notice first that if a central planner is constrained to choose the match between
buyer s and seller t, buyer s’s constrained efficient investment is the solution to the following problem:
x∗(s, t) = argmax
x
v(σ(s, x), τt)− C(x). (A.32)
This investment x∗(s, t) is defined by the following necessary and sufficient first order conditions of (A.32):
v1(σ(s, x
∗(s, t)), τt) σ2(s, x∗(s, t)) = C ′(x∗(s, t)). (A.33)
The result then follows from the observation that the definition of the constrained efficient investment x∗(s, t),
equation (A.33), coincides with the definition of buyer s’s optimal investment xs(t): equation (21).
Condition (21) implies that:
d σ(s, xs(t))
d s
=
σ1 v1 σ22 − σ1 C ′′ − v1 σ2 σ12
v11 (σ2)2 + v1 σ22 − C ′′ < 0
d σ(s, xs(t))
d t
=
v12 (σ2)
2
v11 (σ2)2 + v1 σ22 − C ′′ < 0,
where the functions σh and σhk, h, k ∈ {1, 2}, are computed at (s, xs(t)); the functions vh and vhk, h, k ∈
{1, 2}, are computed at (σ(s, xs(t)), τt) and the second derivative of the cost function C ′′ is the second
derivative of the cost function C(·) computed at xs(t).
Proof of Proposition 5: We prove this result in three steps. We first show that the buyers’ equilibrium
qualities σ(i, xi(i)) associated with the equilibrium si = i satisfy condition (23). We then show that the net
payoff to buyer i associated with any given quality σ of this buyer is continuous in σ. This result is not obvious
since, from Lemma 1 — given the investment choices of other buyers — buyer i can change his equilibrium
match by changing his quality σ. Finally, we show that this net payoff has a unique global maximum and
this maximum is such that the corresponding quality σ is in the interval in which buyer i is matched with
seller i. These steps clearly imply that each buyer i has no incentive to deviate and choose an investment
different from the one that maximizes his net payoff and yields an equilibrium match with seller i.
Let piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ)) be the net payoff to buyer i where x(i, σ) denotes buyer i’s investment level
associated with quality σ:
σ(i, x(i, σ)) ≡ σ. (A.34)
Step 1: Buyer i’s equilibrium quality σ(i, xi(i)) is such that: σ(i, xi(i)) = σi < σ(i− 1, xi−1(i− 1)) = σi−1,
for all i = 2, . . . , S.
The proof follows directly from Proposition 4 above.
Step 2: The net payoff piBi (σ)− C(x(i, σ)) is continuous in σ.
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Let (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σS) be the given ordered vector of the qualities of the buyers, other than i. Notice
that, if σ ∈ (σi−1, σi+1), by Lemma 1 buyer i is matched with the seller of quality τi. Then by Corollary 1
and the definition of v(·, ·), C(·), σ(·, ·) and (A.34), the payoff function piBi (σ)−C(x(i, σ)) is continuous in σ.
Consider now the limit for σ → σ−i−1 from the right of the net payoff to buyer i when it is matched with
the seller of quality τi, σ ∈ (σi+1, σi−1). From (8) this limit is
piBi (σ
−
i−1) − C(x(i, σ−i−1)) = v(σi−1, τi)− v(σi+1, τi) +
+
T∑
h=i+1
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)]− C(x(i, σi−1)).
(A.35)
Conversely, if σ ∈ (σi−1, σi−2) then, by Lemma 1, buyer i is matched with the seller of quality τi−1 and the
payoff is continuous in this interval. Then from (8) the limit for σ → σ+i−1 from the left of the net payoff to
buyer i when matched with the seller of quality τi−1 is
piBi (σ
+
i−1) − C(x(i, σ+i−1)) = v(σi−1, τi−1)− v(σi−1, τi−1) +
+ v(σi−1, τi)− v(σi+1, τi) +
+
T∑
h=i+1
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)]− C(x(i, σi−1)).
(A.36)
In the latter case, while the buyer of quality σ is matched with the seller of quality τi−1, the buyer of quality
σi−1 is matched with the seller of quality τi. Equation (A.35) coincides with equation (A.36) since the first
two terms of the left-hand-side of equation (A.36) are identical. A similar argument shows continuity of the
net payoff function at σ = σh, h = 1, . . . , i− 2, i+ 1, . . . , N .
Step 3: The net surplus function piBi (σ)−C(x(i, σ)) has a unique global maximum in the interval (σi+1, σi−1).
Notice that in the interval (σi+1, σi−1), by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, the net payoff piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ))
takes the following expression:
piBi (σ)− C(x(i, σ)) = v(σ, τi)− v(σi+1, τi) +
T∑
h=i+1
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)]− C(x(i, σ)). (A.37)
This expression, and therefore the net payoff piBi (σ)−C(x(i, σ)), is strictly concave in σ (by strict concavity
of v(·, τi), σ(i, ·) and strict convexity of C(·)) in the interval (σi+1, σi−1) and reaches a maximum at σi =
σ(i, xi(i)) as defined in (21) above. Notice, further, that in the right adjoining interval (σi−1, σi−2), by Lemma
1 and Proposition 1, the net payoff piBi (σ)−C(x(i, σ)) takes the following expression — different from (A.37):
piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ)) = v(σ, τi−1)− v(σi−1, τi−1) +
+ v(σi−1, τi)− v(σi+1, τi) +
+
T∑
h=i+1
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)]− C(x(i, σ)).
(A.38)
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This new expression of the net payoff piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ)) is also strictly concave (by strict concavity of
v(·, τi−1), σ(i, ·) and strict convexity of C(·)) and reaches a maximum at σ(i, xi(i− 1)). From Proposition 4
above we know that
σ(i, xi(i− 1)) < σi−1 = σ(i− 1, xi−1(i− 1)).
This implies that in the interval (σi−1, σi−2) the net payoff piBi (σ)− C(x(i, σ)) is strictly decreasing in σ.
A symmetric argument shows that the net payoff piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ)) is strictly decreasing in σ in any
interval (σh, σh−1) for every h = 2, . . . , i− 2.
Notice, further, that in the left adjoining interval (σi+2, σi+1), by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, the net
payoff piBi (σ)− C(x(i, σ)) takes the following expression, different from (A.37) and (A.38).
piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ)) = v(σ, τi+1)− v(σi+2, τi+1) +
+
T∑
h=i+2
[v(σh, τh)− v(σh+1, τh)]− C(x(i, σ)).
(A.39)
This new expression of the net payoff piBi (σ)− C(x(i, σ)) is also strictly concave in σ (by strict concavity of
v(·, τi+1), σ(i, ·) and strict convexity of C(·)) and reaches a maximum at σ(i, xi(i+1)) which, from Proposition
4, is such that σi+1 = σ(i+ 1, xi+1(i+ 1)) < σ(i, xi(i+ 1)). This implies that in the interval (σi+2, σi+1) the
net payoff piBi (σ)− C(x(i, σ)) is strictly increasing in σ.
A symmetric argument shows that the net payoff piBi (σ) − C(x(i, σ)) is strictly increasing in σ in any
interval (σk+1, σk) for every k = i+ 2, . . . , T − 1.
Proof of Proposition 6: First, for a given ordered vector of sellers’ quality functions (τ(1, ·), . . . , τ(T, ·)) we
construct an inefficient equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game such that there exist one buyer, labelled
sj , j ∈ {2, . . . , S}, such that sj < sj−1.
To show that a vector (s1, . . . , sj , . . . , sS) is an equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game we need to
verify that condition (23) holds for every i = 2, . . . , S and no buyer si has an incentive to deviate and choose
an investment x different from xsi(i), as defined in (20).
Notice first that for every buyer other than sj and sj−1, Proposition 5 applies and hence it is an equilibrium
for each buyer to choose investment level xsi(i), as defined in (20), such that (23) is satisfied. We can therefore
restrict attention to buyers sj and sj−1. In particular, we need to consider a buyer sj−1 of a quality arbitrarily
close to the one of buyer sj . This is achieved by considering a sequence of quality functions σ
n(sj−1, ·) that
converges uniformly to σ(sj , ·).19 Then, from definition (20), the continuity and strict concavity of v(·, τ) and
σ(s, ·), the continuity and strict convexity of C(·) and the continuity of v1(·, τ), σ2(s, ·) and C ′(·), for any
19The sequence σn(sj−1, ·) converges uniformly to σ(sj , ·) if and only if
lim
n→∞ supx
|σn(sj−1, x)− σ(sj , x)| = 0.
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given ε > 0 there exists an index nε such that from every n > nε:
∣∣σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j − 1))− σ(sj , xsj (j − 1))∣∣ < ε. (A.40)
From Proposition 4 and the assumptions sj < sj−1 we also know that for every n > nε:
σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j − 1)) < σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)). (A.41)
While from the assumption τj < τj−1 we have that:
σ(sj , xsj (j)) < σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)). (A.42)
Inequalities (A.40), (A.41) and (A.42) imply that for any buyer sj−1 characterized by the quality function
σn(sj−1, ·) where n > nε, the equilibrium condition (23) is satisfied:
σ(sj , xsj (j)) < σ
n(sj−1, xsj−1(j − 1)). (A.43)
To conclude that (s1, . . . , sj , . . . , sS) is an equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game we still need to
show that neither buyer sj nor buyer sj−1 want to deviate and choose an investment different from xsj (j) and
xsj−1(j−1), where the quality function associated with buyer sj−1 is σn(sj−1, ·) for n > nε. Consider the net
payoff to buyer sj : pi
B
sj (σ) − C(x(sj , σ)). An argument symmetric to the one used in Step 2 of Proposition
5 shows that this payoff function is continuous in σ. Moreover, from the notation of σj in Section 4 above,
Proposition 4, (A.41) and (A.43), we obtain that σj < σ
n
j−1 < σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)) < σj−2. Then using an
argument symmetric to the one used in Step 3 of the proof of Proposition 5 we conclude that this net payoff
function has two local maxima at σj and σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)) and a kink at σnj−1. We then need to show that
there exist at least one element of the sequence σnj−1 such that the net payoff pi
B
sj (σ)− C(x(sj , σ)) reaches a
global maximum at σj . Then, when the quality function of buyer sj−1 is σn(sj−1, ·) buyer sj has no incentive
to deviate and choose a different investment.
From (8) the net payoff piBsj (σ)−C(x(sj , σ)) computed at σj is greater than the same net payoff computed
at σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)) if and only if
v(σj , τj) − C
(
x(sj , σ(j))
) ≥
≥ v(σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)), τj−1) − v(σnj−1, τj−1) +
+ v(σnj−1, τj)− C
(
x
(
sj , σ(sj , xsj (j − 1))
)) (A.44)
Inequality (A.40) above and the continuity of v(·, τj−1), σ(sj , ·) and C(·) imply that for any given ε > 0
there exist a ξε and a nξε such that for every n > nξε
∣∣v(σ(sj , xsj (j − 1)), τj−1)− v(σnj−1, τj−1)∣∣ < ξε and∣∣C (x (sj , σ(sj , xsj (j − 1))))− C (x(sj , σnj−1))∣∣ < ξε. These two inequalities imply that a necessary condition
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for (A.44) to be satisfied is
v(σj , τj)− C (x(sj , σj)) ≥ v(σnj−1, τj)− C
(
x(sj , σ
n
j−1)
)
+ 2ξε. (A.45)
We can now conclude that there exists an ε > 0 such that, for every n > nξε , condition (A.45) is satisfied
with strict inequality. This is because (by strict concavity of v(·, τj), σ(sj , ·) and strict convexity of C(·)) the
function v(σ, τj)− C (x(sj , σ)) is strictly concave and has a unique interior maximum at σj .
Consider now the net payoff to buyer sj−1: piBsj−1(σ) − C(x(sj−1, σ)). An argument symmetric to the
one used above allows us to prove that this payoff function is continuous in σ. Further, from the notation
of σj in Section 4 above, Proposition 4, and (A.43) we have that σj+1 < σ
n(sj−1, xsj−1(j)) < σj < σ
n
j−1.
Therefore we conclude that the net surplus function piBsj−1(σ)− C(x(sj−1, σ)) has two local maxima at σnj−1
and σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j)) and a kink at σj . We still need to prove that there exist at least one element of the
sequence σnj−1 such that the net payoff pi
B
sj−1(σ) − C(x(sj−1, σ)) reaches a global maximum at σnj−1 which
implies that, when the quality function of buyer sj−1 is σn(sj−1, ·), this buyer has no incentive to deviate
and choose a different investment.
From (8), the net payoff piBsj−1(σ)− C(x(sj−1, σ)) computed at σnj−1 is greater than the same net payoff
computed at σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j)) if and only if
v(σnj−1, τj−1) − v(σj , τj−1) + v(σj , τj)− C
(
x(sj−1, σnj−1)
) ≥
≥ v(σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j)), τj)− C
(
x
(
sj−1, σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j))
)) (A.46)
Definition (20), the continuity and strict concavity of v(·, τj) and σ(sj−1, ·), the continuity and strict convexity
of C(·) and the continuity of v1(·, τj), σ2(sj , ·) and C ′(·) imply that for given ε′ > 0 there exists a nε′ , a
ξε′ and a nξε′ such that from every n > nε′ :
∣∣σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j))− σj∣∣ < ε′; while for every n > nξε′∣∣v(σj , τj)− v(σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j)), τj)∣∣ < ξε′ and ∣∣∣C (x(sj−1, σj))− C(x (sj−1, σn(sj−1, xsj−1(j))))∣∣∣ < ξε. The
last two inequalities imply that a necessary condition for (A.46) to be satisfied is
v(σnj−1, τj−1)− C
(
x(sj−1, σnj−1)
) ≥ v(σj , τj−1)− C (x(sj−1, σj)) + 2ξε′ . (A.47)
We can now conclude that there exists a ε′ > 0 such that for every n > nξε′ condition (A.47) is satisfied with
strict inequality. This is because (by strict concavity of v(·, τj−1), σn(sj−1, ·) and strict convexity of C(·))
the function v(σ, τj−1)−C (x(sj−1, σ)) is strictly concave and has a unique interior maximum at σnj−1. This
concludes the construction of the inefficient equilibrium of the buyers’ investment game.
We need now to show that for any given vector of buyers’ quality functions (σ(s1, ·), . . . , σ(sS , ·)) it is
possible to construct an ordered vector of sellers quality functions (τ(1, ·), . . . , τ(T, ·)) such that no inefficient
equilibrium exist.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that an inefficient equilibrium exists for any ordered vector of sellers’
quality functions (τ(1, ·), . . . , τ(T, ·)). Consider first the case in which this inefficient equilibrium is such that
there exists only one buyer sj such that sj < sj−1. Let τn(j − 1, ·) be a sequence of quality functions for
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seller (j − 1) such that τn(j − 1, y) > τ(j, y) for all y and τn(j − 1, ·) converges uniformly to τ(j, ·). From
Proposition 4 and the assumption sj < sj−1 we have that
σ(sj , xsj (j)) > σ(sj−1, xsj−1(j)) (A.48)
where xsj (j) and xsj−1(j) are defined in (20). Further, denote x
n
sj−1(j − 1) the optimal investment defined,
as in (21), by the following set of first order conditions:
v1(σ(sj−1, xnsj−1(j − 1)), τnj−1) σ2(sj−1, xnsj−1(j − 1)), τnj−1) = C ′(xnsj−1(j − 1)).
Then from Proposition 4 we have that
σ(sj−1, xnsj−1(j − 1)) > σ(sj−1, xsj−1(j)). (A.49)
Further, continuity of the functions v(σ, ·), v1(σ, ·), σ(s, ·), σ2(s, ·), C(·) and C ′(·) imply that for given εˆ > 0
there exist an nεˆ such that for every n > nεˆ∣∣∣σ(sj−1, xnsj−1(j − 1))− σ(sj−1, xsj−1(j))∣∣∣ < εˆ. (A.50)
Then from (A.48), (A.49) and (A.50) there exists an εˆ > 0 and hence an nεˆ such that for every n > nεˆ
σ(sj , xsj (j)) > σ(sj−1, x
n
sj−1(j − 1)). (A.51)
Inequality (A.51) clearly contradicts the necessary condition (23) for the existence of the inefficient equilib-
rium.
A similar construction leads to a contradiction in the case the inefficient equilibrium is characterized by
more than one buyer sj such that sj < sj−1.
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